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How does Incentive Affect 





Renal disease is an ongoing and growing problem around the world 
and in Turkey. Almost %5 of health expenditures are about kidney 
patients in Turkey. The amount of patients is increasing every day 
although the donation rates are not increasing in the same speed. 
The governments are applying different regimes for closing the 
gap between supply and demand on kidney. These systems are not 
accurate to close this gap. Main classification of these techniques is 
opt - in and opt - out regimes.  The cost of dialysis for every patient 
is higher than the cost of transplantation. The transplanted patient 
lives 22 years whether dialysis patient lives 14 years. Transplantation is 
cost –effective than dialysis. It is an obligation to decrease the number 
of patients in the waiting list. In 2014 there are almost 60.000 kidney 
disease patients in Turkey and 29.000 of them are ESRD patients. 
Almost 4200 of them are transplanted in 2014. One of the solutions 
of closing this difference is to pay monetary incentive to possible 
living donors. Among the ethical debates on monetarizing the human 
body, this article is focused on the quantity of monetary incentive that 
would pay to the possible donors. This amount is the collection of the 
costs of statistical value of life, death-risk component, quality of life 
component and value of time. It is the quantity of losses, not the value 
of a kidney. The quantity differs according to the value of statistical 
life. Average price for these losses are 8.638 TL. 
Keywords: ESRD, Monetary incentive, Kidney disease, Kidney 
transplantation.
JEL Codes: I110, I150, I180
1. INTRODUCTION
Renal impairment is a disease which is rapidly approaching 
to be a problem in Turkey and in the world. From the first 
kidneytransplantation surgery till today, supply of kidney is 
still standing as an unsolved problem. Although this problem 
is tried to be overcome by peritoneal dialysis and hemodialysis 
techniques, the diseaseis not healing; but only being delayed. 
Since producing a kidney in laboratory conditions or re-
functioning an ineffective kidney is impossible, the last 
solution, which renal impairment patients refer to at the last 
phase of their disease, is kidney transplantation. There is no 
cure for End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) patients other than 
transplantation.
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Curing the disease with the transplantation of a kidney is more 
effective than holding on the life with dialysis. While the average 
life year of transplanted patient is 21,6 years, the average life year of 
dialysis patient is 13,8 years (Harihan et al.:2000). When considered 
from the costs point of view, the cost of transplantation, even with 
a rough calculation, is less than the costs of dialysis.1 If all unrelated 
costs like transportation, lodging, labor-loss are added to this 
calculation, one can see the advantage of transplantation.
At this stage, kidney supply problem for transplantation is 
arising. Different methods are used and tried to overcome this 
supply problem. The method used in many countries is “Altruistic 
Donation”. Whether this system differs in content and practice, 
international data shows that it is unsuccessful (Irodat 2013). Waiting 
list is growing day by day, buton the other hand donation quantities 
are stand nearlyat the same level. At this point, academicians express 
that different and effective methods must be implemented.
Main axis of method change proposal constitutesmonetary 
incentive. Matas, who wrote several essays on the subject, published 
the results of the study group constituted in 2012 for the research 
about the incentives and legal regulations. (Matas: 2012).
Applying monetary incentive fororgan donation (it can be 
named as selling kidney) is a subject that has different aspects. One of 
these aspects is about the fact that organ donation should definitely 
be on voluntary basis. In America and England, government applied 
payment on blood donation for a period and a decline at donation 
rate was observed. Based on this example, some academicians 
defend the opinion that if monetary incentive is allowed, donation 
rates will decline. Conducted surveys have showed that people rather 
prefer donating their organs instead of selling them (Mohamer 
& Guella: 2013; Mayrhofer-Reinhartshuber: 2006; Evans: 2003; 
Leider & Roth: 2010; Bilgel: 2011). But results of these surveys are 
closely related with the questions and demographic structure of 
the participants. These surveys have generally been applied in or 
around the university. It is expected that people who are willing to 
sell his kidney would be poorer and having financial difficulties. It 
is possible to have different results if these surveys are applied at 
places in which low-income group of people live.
Selling kidney has several dimensions. First of all, from whom 
will the kidney be taken, from a living person or from a cadaver? 
While if it is a cadaver, not only kidneys but also eye, tissue, heart, 
lung, liver and other organs could be taken; if it is a living person, only 
kidney and part of the liver could be transplanted. For this reason, 
1 Government pays 158 TL for each dialysis session. Almost %96 of the patients is 
having dialysis 3 times a week. Cost of dialysis for a patient in a year is: 158x3x52 
= 24648 TL. Payment for transplantation is 35000 TL on average. All the costs are 
paid by government health expenditures.
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at the center of most researches there is kidney transplantation.
Monetary incentive also has several dimensions. Indirect 
incentive is one of these methods. The reason why it is“indirect” 
is that it is not paid directly in cash. The proposals about indirect 
incentives are concentrated into three groups: tax impulsion; 
insurance and health expenditure incentives; and reimbursement 
of expenses. Incentive mechanisms proposing covering health 
expenses besides tax support are also among proposals (Peters: 
1991). Even these kind of incentives have been proposed, they 
haven’t been applied in America (Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) 
(Ubel et al.:2000). Again in Pennsylvania, although net payment 
for funeral and hospital expanses is proposed, they have not been 
applied (Ubel et al.:2000).
Another system proposes direct incentive. Direct incentive is 
based on making payment in cash to donor or donor’s family. In 
this type of system, different alternatives are proposed about the 
quantity and the way of the payment. Quantity of the payment 
has become a different subject for discussions. One of the simple 
ways to identify the quantity is to take the price of kidney in the 
black market. But the price at the black market differs with respect 
to middle-men, donor, and recipient and also from country to 
country. For this reason, considering the price of the black market 
will not be the correct choice.
Another proposal for the quantity of the payment is the 
difference between dialysis and transplantation costs. Difference 
between the cost of dialysis for one year (or afew years) and 
transplantation costs will directly be paid to the donor (Matas: 
2012). 
The most solid calculation is the one mentioned in Becker and 
Elias’s article handling monetary incentive in 2007 (Becker & Elias: 
2007).
At this paper, the author makes the calculation based on 
the donor’s labor-loss, hospital expenditures, lounge, food and 
beverage costs, monetary equivalence of the impaired quality of 
life, monetary equivalence of the risk of death during or after the 
surgery and the statistical value of life basis. In this study, Becker 
and Elias’s calculations will be adapted to our day and to Turkey.
Another system is paying a net payment that the government 
determined. This system is already active in the only country that 
allows the trade of kidney; Iran. In this model that is called the 
Iranian model, the government or an entity that is authorized by 
government make a sum of payment; if the donor demands an 
additional payment, it will be paid by the recipient. If the recipient 
cannot afford this payment, the remaining amount would be paid 
by a charitable foundation (Ghods & Savaj: 2006).
Some studies have been conducted about the amount of money 
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that people would be willing to sell their kidney. These studies are 
generally concentrated on determination of this amount by surveys. 
Hoeyer et al categorized the papers of financial support models on 
social behaviors and summarized their results (Hoeyer et al.:2013). 
According to this analysis, American people are more consentient 
to sell organs with respect to European people. The study that is 
among the rest surveys is the study conducted by Adams, Barnett 
and Kasermann in 1999. According to this survey, a 117% increase 
is foreseen on donation rates with $1000 incentive. If incentive 
quantities are more than $1000, it would result a little bit more 
increase but this increase is not radical (Adams et al.:1997). The 
subjects handled at some of the surveys focused on the question: 
“if there is financial incentive, will you donate?” rather than the 
quantity (Mohamed & Guella: 2013; Mayrhofer – Reinhartshuber: 
2006).
Another debate is from whom the organ will be taken. Some of 
the authors defend that the donor must only be cadavers (Robertson: 
1999). But researches showed that; even if organs are taken from 
the entire eligible cadavers, the demand would not be met (Sheey 
et al.:2003). 
Other than these, some other methods to increase the 
organ donation come to the fore. The other proposal than can be 
considered in the incentive scope is the small scaled ‘‘encouraging’’ 
incentives. The primary one of these is making discounts at driving 
license fees in exchange for tagging as donor in driving licenses. This 
application does not directly target to increase donation, but aims 
to increase the donor numbers. This system is actually in practice 
at Georgia with $7 discount-incentive per person. According to 
researchers’ results, this type of incentive results in a comparable 
growth at donor numbers (Jasper et al.:1999; DeJong et al.:1995).
2. KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION AND DIALYSIS IN 
TURKEY
From the first kidney transplantation in 1975 (Karaali& 
Haberal:2005) till today, kidney transplantation in Turkey showed 
a serious increase in quality and quantity. With the help of the legal 
regulations, that renewed and updated in time, the quality, speed and 
security of the transplantation has increased. But, since the opt-in 
regime is still applied in Turkey, the kidney demand is irretrievable. 
Every day the number of dialysis patients is increasing everyday but 
kidney supply is not increasing adequately. Although Turkey takes 
place on the top on living donor numbers (46,6 pmp), it is pretty far 
behind being the leading country at cadaver donations (5 pmp) and 
take part at the middle parts of world ranking in the mean (IRODAT 
2014). The health expenditures on dialysis and transplantation, 
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exceeds 2% of the health ministry2 (www.saglik.gov.tr). When it is 
considered that transplantation is more profitable than dialysis for 
the government, being donor should be encouraged.
Ministry of Health data from 2014 appearing at the web site 
(www.organ.saglik.gov.tr) will be used in the following parts of the 
study. According to these data, number of transplantation in 2014 
is 4263 and patients in the waiting list are 25337. There is only one 
donor death occurred after transplantation. All of the dialysis and 
transplantation expenses either for donor or for recipient are paid 
by Social Insurance System. 59% of dialysis patients are registered 
to the Social Insurance System.
The data are beginning from the year 2011 at the official 
website. There are no radical changes in dialysis patients, number 
of donor and number of transplantationsin the given years. In 
this content, using 2014 datafor the proceeding calculations is 
considered suitable.
3. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MONETARY INCENTIVE 
Among the proposals for increasing the transplantation 
quantity, monetary incentiveis being written widely in academic 
literature in recent years. Becker and Elias are the pioneers about the 
rational determination of the amount that would be paid (Becker 
& Elias: 2007). In their calculation for the monetary incentive, they 
took three main matters as principals: the first one is monetary 
incentive for death risk, the second one is monetary incentive for 
the healing period and third one is monetary incentive with respect 
to decreasing life quality.
First of all, the price of the death risk is calculated. Life-loss 
during the transplant surgery is about 1% in USA. This ratio is 
about 0,0235% in Turkey (see Appendix). For the calculation of 
the optimal value, Statistical Value of Life (SVL) is needed. There 
is no such calculated SVL for Turkey currently. According to 
World Health Organization (WHO), there exist a calculated SVL 
for Eurozone which is 2.487.283 Euro3 and this quantity will be 
converted to Turkish Lira (TL) and used in this article. The SVL, 
which is necessary for these kind of calculations, must be calculated 
by Ministry of Health or Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI). However, 
it is not calculated because of different reasons except for developed 
countries. In the sensitivity analysis, the most suitable value for the 
statistical value of life in various amounts will be calculated.
The monetary equivalent found depending on the statistical 
2 Dialysis expenditure per patient multiplied by number of dialysis patients and 
average expenditure of transplantations are added according to health ministry 
data. 2014 health ministry budget is used.
3 http://www.heatwalkingcycling.org/index.php?pg=requirements&act=vsl&PH
PSESSID=q3jkco40bnm8aj7poon2v765o5
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value of human life of the probability of dying during the surgery is 
approximately 906,41 TL. The calculation can be seen at Appendix 
(1).  
As the second component is the value of monetary-loss during 
the treatment process. The determination is done by calculating the 
healing period as approximately 4 weeks. Although this period is 
not fully healing period, it is enough duration to return working 
in full capacity again. The rest of the period is foreseen as medical 
treatment. For calculating the money-loss during recovery, the 
lowest civil servant salary is used and semi-annually salary raise is 
ignored. Within these constraints, the value of recovery period is 
approximately 1.951,4 TL (see Appendix).
As the third component, the calculation of the value of change 
in life quality should be calculated. While doing this calculation, 
SVL must be multiplied with Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY). 
Since there is no calculated QALY value for Turkey, the quantity of 
Becker and Elias’ article is used. In the light of this information, the 
quantity is approximately calculated as 5779.8 TL (see Appendix). 
The calculated values are primarily in direct relationship with SVL 
(Viscusi & Aldy: 2003). Generally, it is calculated for health sector 
so the amount that is calculated by WHO is used. According to 
these results, optimum monetary incentive for grafting a donor’s 
kidney is approximately 8.638 TL. 
The cost of transplantation  is also needed for proper evaluation. 
For that reason, 55.000 TL that is the standard payment of the 
government for transplantation is taken. So, demand percentage 
change is found as 21,85 %. When the demand function has unit 
elasticity, it will make 21,85 % effect on transplantation demand. 
To calculate the effect of this percentage change on the 
transplantation amount, total kidney demand in 2014 will be 
used. While the total demand for kidney was 29600 in 2014, the 
number of transplantation was 4263. Number of patients in the 
waiting list was 25337 (www. Donor.saglik.gov.tr). In this case, the 
effect of change on demand will be 6466. So, the amount requested 
after the change will decrease to 27397. The necessary amount 
will decrease as 16668 since the demand will lessen in the case of 
monetary payment is done for the kidney. With a 21,85% decrease 
in the demand, whole requested amount of kidney will be met. In 
this case, the transplantation number will increase to 27397. So the 
percentage increase in demand of kidney after payment to donors 
will be 485,3 %. Theoretically, these increases will be enough to 
cover all kidney demand. 
3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
As indicated at previous sections, the effect of monetary 
incentive on organ transplantation depends on two factors: the 
first is the effect of payment for organ to transplantation costs;and 
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the second is the demand elasticity of organ transplantation 
(Becker & Elias: 2007). In this section, the change of demand 
and transplantation amount with respect to price changes will be 
analyzed.
Since the statistical value of life appearing in the first column 
differs according to calculation techniques and sectors, SVL will be 
used as a variable in the sensitivity analysis. In the second column, 
risk of death component is held constant. Since it does not differ 
with respect to person or system, this ratio is taken as 0,0235%. 
Change in SVL will affect this result. 
In the third column, since QALY component is also the same, 
0,0014985 is taken as a multiplier. Since this column will also 
differ according to SVL; changes in this column are the result of 
the changes in SVL. The monetary equivalence of labor-loss can 
be seen in the fourth column. The minimum civil servant salary is 
taken basis for calculation so no change is expected in this column. 
For this reason the number is held stable.
After all the components are added,it is seen that the price of 
the kidney ranges between 5300 TL to 12000 TL. Price elasticity 
of demand is taken as -1 for kidney transplantation which is 
corresponding to 527% to 443% change on transplantation 
amounts. Even the SVL is calculated higher, the change in total 
transplantation amount stands out as high. 
At this stage, the importance of the components rises to the 
surface. First of all, since the life of human is in question, statistical 
value of the life must be known for the calculations. The other 
one, death risk component, shows the monetary incentive given to 
donor in return for having risk of death during or after the surgery. 
For calculating this component, the SVL must be known, too. 
Donor will have a “life-quality” loss because of an organ deficiency. 
Although this loss will not be so high to affect the rest of his life 
substantially, a loss is in question to a certain extent. While this life-
quality loss ratio is not explicitly given in Becker and Elias’s article, 
it is taken from the calculations. Since this ratio is independent 
from country or values, it is constant. Lastly, since the donor loses 
“time” for healing, the monetary value of the lost time period must 
be calculated.


















1928541 453,2 2890 1951,4 5295 9,63 527,51
3101440 728,8 4648 1951,4 7328 13,32 501,84
3857080 906,4 5780 1951,4 8638 15,70 485,30
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4652161 1093,3 6971 1951,4 10016 18,21 467,90
5785621 1359,6 8670 1951,4 11981 21,78 443,10
When it is considered that the costs of dialysis – even if the 
highest SVL is taken for calculation – are more expensive than total 
kidney value, it can be said that giving monetary incentive payment 
will result in decreasing/ending kidney waiting-list patients and 
also gainin economy will be higher.
The graphic below shows the relationship between percentage 
change in price and percentage change in transplantation with 
respect to the percentage change in price. As it can be understood 
from the graphic, while percentage changes are not redundant and 
rapid, fast decreases in percentage changes of transplantation are 
observed. As the reason of that, the gap between transplantation 
needs and transplantation amounts can be suggested. Since there 
are great differences between actual kidney transplant numbers and 
kidney requirements, a small percentage change will cause dramatic 
changes on transplantation amounts. Even in the case that the 
price increases; kidney amount and transplant amount that would 
be demanded (under the assumption that all the demand is met) 
are still very high. The numbers in this article shows the minimum 
monetary incentive to be paid in the case the market is set free. 
Since the prices billed to the receiver in the black market are highly 
higher than this amount, even the price increases, there will still be 
(a lot of) buyers. 
Graph 1: Percentage Change in Total Transplantation
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4. THE BENEFITS OF DECREASING THE WAITING LIST
According to Ministry of Health data, waiting time in the 
kidney waiting-list is approximately 7 years. It is not certain to find 
a kidney in this period. Since the majority of the kidney patients are 
above 60 years, survival of these patients in this waiting period is 
doubtful. Nonetheless, diabetics and cardiac failure arises together 
with the kidney failure (Stel et al.: 2012). When the necessity of 
providing physiological support to the patients is considered, the 
cost of renal failure disease is further increasing. Besides, these 
expenditures are not enough to heal the disease.
Decrease in waiting time means that the patients would get 
healthy again sooner than anticipated. A dialysis patient cannot 
be fully productive during his/her life and besides always require 
support and medical care. When considered from this perspective, 
every dialysis patient is restraining another person to participate in 
production/labor force.
In general, kidney patients are trying to cover the dialysis and 
treatment expenses by him at the beginning. This results in a wealth 
loss to some extent.
Extension of waiting time is also a factor affecting the patient’s 
recovery during and after the transplantation. If the recipient 
suffers from ESRD for a long time, he/she becomes unavailable for 
transplantation. Death is a matter of time for these kinds ofpatients. 
The extension of waiting time causes a major decrease of the 
patients’ life quality and causes a significant deterioration.As long 
as the time passes, the patients as well as his/her beloveds become 
nervous. So, social welfare loss for this type of patients and their 
next-of-kin is inevitable. 
The difference between supply and demand of kidney is 
growing day by day. This difference results in extension of waiting 
time. This extension leads patients to try illegal ways to find kidney. 
Since this problem cannot be eliminated in a short time, patients 
have to find different, illegal and unethical ways. The government 
does not have solid and quick solutions for ESRD patients. This gap 
will be fulfilled by kidney black market. It is obvious that, donation 
system cannot meet the demand. Donation encouraging systems, 
mechanisms and advertisement policies are not satisfying the 
needs. On the other hand, ESRD patients are dying day by day and 
these patients do not have time to wait for a “legal” kidney. Since 
there is not any governmental control on the market, middlemen 
have exorbitant gains. Not applying an effective enforcement to 
the caught buyers, sellers and middlemen can be seen as one of 
the reasons of not being able to prevent black-marketing. Illegal 
organizations prefer the countries that have legal loopholes. 
Turkey was one of the haunted until the re-regulations on the 
legislation in 2012. Transplantation centers and the competence of 
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transplantation teams are advanced in Turkey. Turkey is competing 
with U.S., in which the first transplantation occurred and who is 
applying transplantation in an advanced way.
Illegal transactions are continuing on one side, on the other side 
people are dying because of the length of the waiting list. The main 
problem here is because of legal regulations. When the regulations 
are directed to eliminate the difficulties like Iran, illegal market will 
vanish, patients will gain their health as well as the money-loss will 
turn to economy. 
Within the donation system, patient would have his health 
(gain), surgical team and hospital would have its fee (gain) but 
donor and his family would not get any winnings (loss). The unique 
gain for donor is the moral satisfaction from saving another’s life. 
This motivation is not enough most of the time. Although Turkey 
is ranked as the first on living donation rates around the world, it is 
on average about deceased kidney donation rates per million capita. 
By current donation mechanisms, it seems impossible to close 
this gap. At this stage, it is a must that the authorities change their 
perspective.
There are some problems about being adonor from the 
individuals’ perspective. People think that if they will be signed 
as a donor, their organs will betaken before death or their medical 
records could be sold to middlemen and they could be “hunted” by 
them. It must be explained properly and explicitly to the people that 
these records are private and unattainable by othersand their organs 
cannot be taken before death. On the other hand, for eliminating the 
religious reasons, there must be a proper and effective integration 
between Religious Affairs and government. 
The studies conducted to increase donation rates finds responses 
immediately. Encouraging applications done by Ministry of Health 
in recent years raised the donation rates to some extent. Thanks to 
campaigns, donation rates had increased by 259% between 2007 and 
2014. After the legal regulations for increasing donation that was 
supported by effective and comprehensive advertisement campaigns 
between 2010 and 2014, donation growth rate was almost % 140 (by 
the end of 2013, 51,6 ppm). Even though these results may seem 
promising, the vast majority of donations are from living donors 
and generally close relatives (by the end of 2013, 46,6 ppm). Turkey 
is ranked as the first on living donation rates.On the other hand, 
deceased kidney donation ratios are relatively small with respect 
to European countries (5 ppm)4. Turkey is well ahead around the 
world in living donor ratios. The explanation of this result is: the 
recipients who cannot find a donor from his close vicinity have to 
wait for a deceased donor but in general, cannot able to get any 
4 Forfurther information please check www.irodat.org registry reports.
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kidney. Death donation rate is far below than the average of the 
world. In this context, studies to increase deceased donation rates 
should be conducted.
Tracking system that is organized by the Ministry of Health 
within the entire country is tracking and allocating is done effectively. 
Even this tracking system, which is attached to a regulation, has 
some faults; it is serving actively and helpfully5. But this system is 
tracking already registered patients and donors. Possible donors 
cannot be known. At this point, the main duty is on medical 
personnel who work at intensive care units and/or emergency 
units. Employees in charge at these critical units, especially doctors, 
could be trained to persuade the families to donate the organs of 
the deceased. Doctors and personnel are usually refraining from 
asking this type of question. Regular trainings are given to the 
staff of dialysis and transplantation units by the Ministry of Health 
periodically. With attempts about this subject, donation rates could 
be increased. While this kind of demand does not have any illegal 
aspect; every study will turn as a benefit from many aspects since 
this kind of attempt would be an encouragement to save lives.
5. ENCOURAGING BEING A LIVING DONOR
The effect of monetary incentive on kidney donation rates is 
analyzed. The quantity of the monetary incentive and the effect 
of it are investigated. In addition to this, some mechanisms that 
encourage being a living donor must be settled.  There are some 
reasons to avoid from being a living donor. First of all, being a 
living donor is scary for most of the people. Living with organ 
deficiency may cause many problems. However, a missing kidney 
will not affect the quality of life significantly. Apart from heavy-
duty employees and sportsmen, living with single kidney does not 
constitute a problem. “Kidney failure” defines malfunctioning of 
both kidneys. For this reason, studies for increasing the donation 
must explicitly explain that there will be no difference about quality 
of life after the donation.
One of the drawbacks is about religious concerns. Vast majority 
of the Turkish people have this concern. “Deceased body must have 
integrity” is the common consensus. Religious Affairs had given 
fatwa about organ donation, so there is not any inconvenience. 
This issue should be expressed at every possible platform by the 
Ministry of Health.
Another concern is about people’s lack of trust towards the 
system. Individuals think that their medical records can be taken by 
third parties and can be used to find a matching donor and tracked. 
It should be clarified that these records are confidential and can 
only be seen by authorized staff.
5 Daily donor tracking system can be seen at the website: https://organ.saglik.
gov.tr/web/
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Possible donor candidates are afraid of dying during the 
surgery. In 2014 there is not any recorded death during surgery and 
only one donor died because of post-surgery complications out of 
4263 transplantation. Death risk during this kind of surgery is less 
than dying because of a car accident. Average death ratio around the 
world is much more than Turkey’s average which is less than % 0,1. 
For this reason, it should be clearly explained that death risk during 
the surgery is almost zero.
Broad and comprehensive explanations have to be done 
while the donor is registered. By clarification of every risks and 
gains explicitly and completely, there will not be any questions 
on the head. General knowledge is not clear so there is not any 
clearance among individuals. Clear information must be given to 
the registered donors and hesitatations must be eliminated. This 
informative explanation will create a domino effect and lead the 
registered donors to persuade non-donors (Thiessenet a.: 2013, 
Parekh et al.: 2008).
6. CONCLUSION
The calculations done in this article are not related with 
commodification of human body. It is aimed to determine the 
amount of monetary incentive in order to meet the kidney need that 
is rising day by day. An approach is done about the quantity of the 
optimum payment amount. The purpose is not buying a kidney but 
compensating the loss (this loss should be separated as time, health 
and quality of life) of consenting donors.
The analysis shows that monetary incentive will get excessive 
gain for both the individuals and also health and insurance system 
perspective. The amount of the payment that is calculated in the 
study is less than yearly dialysis costs. For this reason, applying 
monetary incentive for kidney donation will be advantageous. Legal 
regulations, ways of payment, quantity and procedure are subject of 
separate studies. At the studies conducted about kidney donation, it 
has been found that people are more eager to donate their kidney 
instead of selling. On the other hand, different segment of the 
people consent to donate in return for monetary incentive. By this 
way, secondary possible donor candidates will be activated and also 
black market will be blocked. 
7. DISCUSSION
“Monetary incentive” could be seen as “selling kidney” by large 
number of people. The distinction must be clearly understood. 
Furthermore paying incentives for kidney donation is accompanied 
by moral debates. The focus of discussion is about “commodification 
of human body”. 
It is emphasized that if selling kidney will be legalized the 
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sellers will usually be poor people and social distinction will 
deepen. When the individuals become desperate, they try deriving 
gains and getting out of the problem without considering if it is 
legal or illegal. Because of that, black market prefers always poor 
and uncontrolled countries. Yet, it is not compulsory that the donor 
is poor. When families are reluctant to donate their deceased family 
member’s organ, monetary incentive would be persuasive. 
Even a monetary incentive system is applied, it is not sure that 
all of the kidney demand will be satisfied. Many contestants cannot 
be “donor” because of their medical incompetence. The main 
reasons of that are alcohol consumption and genetic disorders.
8. APPENDIX
Statistical value of life:
Statistical value of life is taken from WHO Eurozone data in 
2011: 2.487.283 Euro. Since the data and calculations are for the 
year 2014, it is obligatory to convert it with power purchasing 
parity. So in 2014;
1 £ = 1, 2938 $ (According to OECD 2009-2014 data)
Over 2014 PPT 1$ = 1,198578 TL.
Then; 2.487.283 x 1, 2938 x 1,198578 = 3.857.080 TL.
Minimum value: 1.243.642 x 1,2938 x 1,198578 = 1.928.541 TL
Maximum value: 3.730.925 x 1,2938 x 1,198578 = 5.785.621 TL
Death risk of donor during or after the operation related with 
complication: 
1/4263 = 0,0235 %
Monetary equivalence of death risk: 3.857.080 x 0,0235 % = 
906,4138 (1)
Monetary equivalence of workforce loss:
Minimum civil servant salary (2014) = 2114 TL.
Healing period is about 4 months, so monetary equivalence of 
workforce loss:
…………(2)
Monetary equivalence QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years):
The ratio that was calculated by Becker-Elias: 0,0014985
3.857.080 x 0,0014985 = 5779,8 TL……………..(3)
The total value of monetary incentive: (1) + (2) + (3) = 8638 TL
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